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1 Introduction 
 
A striking phenomenon of recent global economic change is the emergence of new 
development actors, with alternative development experiences and development financing 
capacity. These actors are now creating collective institutional capacity with the aim of 
contributing to other countries’ development. They are also increasingly influencing the path 
of global development. 
  
One of the most important examples is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The 
AIIB has a number of important features which distinguish it from existing institutions. Most 
of its capital is provided by emerging and developing governments, for example. Also, the 
composition of its membership means that it is likely to mainstream the alternative 
development experiences of these members, as well as emerging countries’ knowledge of 
the development process more generally. The AIIB therefore has much to contribute to our 
understanding of development in general, and development financing in particular. The 
opportunity for developing and emerging economies to benefit from this new source of 
knowledge, policy and practice as they chart their own development paths is significant.  
 
While the AIIB is a key part of a shift in the development finance architecture towards more 
South–South institutions, it is also important that it has incorporated many developed 
economies into its membership. This creates the possibility for the AIIB to learn positive 
lessons from their experiences, as well as avoiding the mistakes they have made, and 
building on the knowledge they have acquired.  
 
As the title of this report suggests, therefore, the AIIB can both learn from the experience of 
these countries’ engagement with the existing system of multilateral development banks 
(MDBs), and contribute to our understanding of development finance by bringing a different 
set of experiences and knowledge to those which underpin these institutions. This report will 
explore both of these aspects.  
 
Although the AIIB is a new institution, many of the challenges it faces are not new. The AIIB 
is a public development bank, like those created after the Second World War to address 
similar challenges to those we face today. The emergence of public development banks in 
the post-Second World War era signalled an important change in the development finance 
paradigm, from reliance on private finance to a more nuanced, mixed economy approach. 
The recognition that private finance alone would not deliver the long-term funding needed to 
finance key development sectors remains crucial today. It is also consistent with the 
priorities and experience of China and other emerging economies, where public 
development banks have been, and remain, central to the process of strategic development.  
 
As with the existing MDBs, however, the AIIB – though owned and capitalised by member 
governments – will fund itself in private capital markets, and co-finance its loans and equity 
with private lenders and investors, as well as public national governments and development 
banks. Public and private finance bring complementary attributes. The task is therefore to 
establish a framework that enables this potential complementarity to be realised. Retaining a 
balance between public and private finance has always been essential, and this remains the 
case. 
 
As its name suggests, the AIIB has been created to help close the very large infrastructure 
financing gap in Asia, estimated at around US$600bn per year, or more once the challenge 
of climate change is taken into account. Climate change mitigation has created a pressing 
need for sustainable infrastructure. Renewable energy is at the heart of this. There is also 
the need to adapt to the changes to climate that cannot be avoided, which means ‘climate-
proofing’ existing and new infrastructure facilities. While this imperative is clear, however, it 
should also be noted that sustainable infrastructure can be more expensive. Where this is 
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the case, it will require some grant contribution from developed country donors for 
developing countries that have neither responsibility for creating the problem, nor the 
capacity to address it. Together, mitigation and adaptation costs may add 10–20 per cent to 
the infrastructure financing gap.  
 
While the challenges of climate change were not known when today’s MDBs were 
established, the need to increase investment in infrastructure is certainly not new. For 
reasons such as the divergence between private and social returns, the scale of capital and 
time frames involved, and technical, financial and regulatory risk (especially important in 
inter-regional projects), the private sector will generally not supply the socially optimal level 
of infrastructure investment. As a result, this has always been a core function of 
governments, and national as well as international development banks. Indeed, many of 
today’s largest MDBs were, to a greater or lesser extent, established to increase 
infrastructure investment. The same is true for the AIIB. 
 
The AIIB is therefore not starting from scratch, but has the opportunity to learn from the 
experiences of these institutions. Over the last half-century, they have had to tackle many 
new challenges. The importance of ensuring negative environmental and social impacts are 
minimised, for example, has become a crucial area for MDBs. Despite the progress that has 
been made in these areas, few would suggest that existing MDBs have successfully 
resolved all issues. As well as learning from these experiences, therefore, the AIIB has the 
opportunity to have a fresh look at the trade-off between those factors and the overall 
development impact of projects, including how these vary by country, sector and mode of 
intervention, and the need to increase the speed as well as the scale of infrastructure 
investment.  
 
To begin a contribution to this process, this report explores what the AIIB can learn about 
infrastructure finance from the experience of the two largest MDBs: the World Bank and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). As well as the relatively slow initial growth of these 
institutions, both started with a focus on infrastructure before diversifying into other sectors. 
This experience may provide some useful longer-term lessons for the AIIB. Also, reports 
suggest that, at least in its early years, the AIIB will primarily co-fund projects with the World 
Bank, but also with the EIB. Increasing understanding of how these institutions became as 
they are should help this process of cooperation.  
 
This practical and technical analysis is complemented by a broader exploration of what the 
AIIB could contribute to our understanding of development finance over time. Given the fact 
that it will be largely funded by developing and emerging countries, and these countries will 
remain in a voting majority, the AIIB is a valuable addition to the existing development 
finance landscape, which is comprised of institutions drawn from a similar historical process, 
and has traditionally been dominated by today’s developed countries, notably the United 
States (US), Europe and Japan. Establishing the AIIB as a ‘knowledge bank’, to which other 
developing and emerging countries can turn for a fresh perspective on how to finance 
development, would inject a healthy dose of plurality into the existing landscape.  
 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the 
World Bank and the EIB, examining their origins, governance arrangements, and their 
approach to sector selection, social and environmental issues, and monitoring and 
evaluation. Section 3 reviews the AIIB’s stated aims and Articles of Agreement and 
considers some of the ways the institution will add value in its operations. Section 4 
considers what criteria the AIIB could use to select sectors and projects and what 
instruments might be most appropriate. Section 5 estimates the level of additional lending 
that the AIIB may be able to provide, and examines the factors that will influence this. 
Section 6 considers broader questions of AIIB ‘additionality’, exploring its potential role as a 
new global ‘knowledge bank’, and what this might mean in practice. Section 7 offers some 
suggestions for future research and concluding remarks.  
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2 The World Bank and the European 
Investment Bank 
2.1 Origins, capital and financing, and governance 
arrangements 
The World Bank was established in 1944. Today it is comprised of the following five 
institutions, forming the World Bank Group:  
 
i. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which was the 
first element to be established in 1944 to assist recovery from the Second World 
War;  
ii. the International Finance Corporation (IFC), established in 1956 to support private 
sector development;  
iii. the International Development Association (IDA), established in 1960 to provide 
concessional loans to low-income countries;  
iv. the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 
1966 to provide arbitration over investment disputes; and  
v. the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which was established in 
1988 to provide guarantees against non-commercial risks to investors in developing 
countries. 
 
The IBRD has 188 member countries. Voting rights are determined by each country’s 
shareholdings, which are a function of their contribution to the capital base, as well as an 
allocation of ‘basic votes’. In principle, shareholdings should reflect economic size, but 
changes have not kept pace with shifts in the relative economic weight of different countries, 
creating significant tensions. The Bank’s subscribed capital today is US$252.8bn, with       
20 per cent of this paid in and the rest callable. The IBRD funds its activities by borrowing in 
capital markets, and has a ‘statutory lending limit’ of 100 per cent of the sum of its capital 
base, retained earnings and reserves, a leverage ratio of 1:1. IDA, in contrast, is supported 
by donor finance, enabling it to offer grants and highly concessional, long-term loans. 
 
The Board of Governors, to which each member nominates one Governor, has overall 
responsibility for the World Bank and meets annually. A smaller Board of Directors is 
responsible for day-to-day operations. The IBRD has 25 executive directors on its Board of 
Directors, with the US, Japan, Germany, France, China, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Kingdom each appointing one executive director. Other countries are grouped into 
constituencies, each of which elects an executive director as its representative (World Bank 
2011). The executive directors select the Group President for a renewable five-year term. 
Every president of the World Bank since its foundation has been a US citizen, despite 
excellent candidates from emerging and developing countries.  
 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) was established in 1958 as part of the Treaty of 
Rome, with the aim of supporting the creation of a common European market, and 
transferring resources from capital-rich to capital-poor countries and regions in Europe. 
Initially capitalised with US$1bn, the EIB’s capital base had reached €243bn by December 
2013. Less than 10 per cent of capital is paid-in. The EIB is also a majority shareholder in 
the more recently established European Investment Fund (EIF) created in 1992. According 
to the EIB statutes, loans and guarantees may not exceed 250 per cent of the subscribed 
capital, reserves and retained earnings, a leverage ratio of 2.5:1. From an original six, the 
EIB today has 28 member states. There are four statutory bodies. The Board of Governors 
sets guiding principles, high-level policies, approves the annual accounts, and appoints 
members of the other governing bodies. The Board of Directors approves financing 
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decisions and operational strategy, and oversees the Management Committee. This 
Committee runs the EIB on a day-to-day basis under the control of the EIB President. 
Finally, the Audit Committee has responsibility for auditing financial accounts, and verifying 
that the EIB conforms to best banking practice.  
2.2 Mandates and sector allocations 
The World Bank’s original mandate was to facilitate reconstruction of war-affected countries 
in Europe. Following the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947, however, the Bank 
switched to providing development support to poorer countries. Originally, the intention was 
to provide guarantees to leverage private investment, but this soon changed to the provision 
of direct loans as it was seen to be more ‘administratively manageable’, as well as more 
profitable for the Bank. In 1948, the first country loan to Chile worth US$13.5m was issued 
followed by loans to Mexico and Brazil in 1949 (Culpeper 1997). The Bank focused 
exclusively on project-based lending at this time. 
 
In its first period, the World Bank primarily lent to infrastructure projects, with over half its 
loans going to power, transport and water projects. In 1960, power and transport accounted 
for 69 per cent of total lending and an average of 55 per cent between 1960 and 1970 (ibid.). 
As the Bank needed to maintain profitability, a major criterion for sector selection was 
potential financial returns on investment in this period. From the late 1960s onwards, a 
gradual delinking between potential return on investment and project selection occurred, 
however, as the Bank began lending into development sectors such as education (Marshall 
2008). The establishment of IDA in 1960, which was financed by donors rather than yield-
requiring capital markets, facilitated this shift in low-income countries. Robert McNamara, 
who became president in 1968 and remained so for 13 years, made fundamental changes to 
the Bank’s philosophy, expanding lending into sectors such as health and nutrition, and 
emphasising global poverty reduction. Under his direction, comprehensive processes for 
project selection and independent project evaluation mechanisms were also established 
(Marshall 2008). 
 
With the oil shocks in the 1970s and multiple financial crises, which followed, the focus on 
project-based financing was complemented with broader-based loans to support economic 
recovery in crisis-affected countries. Over time, this was to culminate in structural adjustment 
lending, where World Bank loans carried conditions requiring borrowers to implement 
extensive macroeconomic adjustment, as well as often radical market-oriented reforms, such 
as privatisations and liberalisation of the financial sector.1 Figure 2.1 highlights these sector 
shifts as percentages of total lending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 A review of structural adjustment is outside of the scope of this report.  
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of World Bank sector lending 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on World Bank data. 
 
The EIB’s original mandate was to promote free trade, and facilitate the development of 
poorer regions, within Europe. As with the World Bank, a large proportion of EIB’s initial 
investments went to infrastructure, as well as to poorer regions in the European Union (EU), 
such as the Italian South (Licari 1969; Griffith-Jones, Steinherr and Fuzzo de Lima 2005). 
The main sectors were interstate transport, industrial facilities and energy. In April 1959, for 
example, the EIB’s first loans were made to the Italian companies, Sincat and Celene, to 
build a large petrochemical complex in Sicily, and Mercure, to exploit a seam of lignite in 
Lucania for electricity (EIB 2015b). Other typical loans made in those early years were to 
construct a hydroelectric power station in Luxembourg, or a natural gas pipeline network in 
France (EIB 2015b; Licari 1969). The largest share of lending during its first decade was to 
the transport sector, with over US$200m spent between 1960 and 1967 to improve railways, 
shipping ports and roads, especially in what were then considered frontier districts (Licari 
1969). 
 
Over the years, the EIB has identified six objectives that it uses to make investment 
decisions: regional development; transport, telecommunication and infrastructure; protection 
of environment; energy; small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and international 
competitiveness of industry and its integration on a community basis (Honohan 1995). 
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Figure 2.2 Evolution of EIB sector lending 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on EIB data. 
 
In the first decade of its existence, the EIB focused only on infrastructure, including energy 
(its main initial focus) and on industry, most of which was also linked to infrastructure. The 
public sector was the predominant borrower to finance infrastructure, energy and capital-
intensive state industry, mostly linked to communications, energy and transport (airlines, 
electricity generation and distribution, telephone systems, etc.). Figure 2.2 details the shift in 
the EIB’s sectorial lending from the 1960s. While there is some diversification to new 
sectors, this is less pronounced than in the case of the World Bank. By the 2000s, 
infrastructure still accounted for around half of all loans, similar to the 1960s.  
 
While recent decades have seen some investment in health and education, and a greater 
emphasis recently on investment to mitigate and adapt to climate change, the largest relative 
shifts are the reduction in agricultural lending, and the introduction of the ‘Global Loan 
Facility’. Under this facility, the EIB lends to financial intermediaries, who lend on to SMEs 
who are too small for the EIB to lend to directly. This mechanism is similar to those used by 
the World Bank and other MDBs. 
2.3 Instruments 
Within the World Bank Group, the three providers of finance are the IBRD, IFC and IDA. The 
first two institutions primarily raise funds by selling bonds on the capital markets and so lend 
at rates that reflect their borrowing costs. While these are ‘market-rates’, their AAA credit 
ratings allow them to borrow more cheaply than would be possible for the countries they lend 
to, and so provide finance at favourable rates to these countries. They can also generally 
borrow more cheaply than commercial banks, and have other risk-reducing features that are 
important in constructing syndicated loan deals. Where external finance needs to be raised, 
for example, the IFC acts as the ‘lender of record’, borrowing on favourable terms and 
making finance available to a syndicate of private lenders on this basis. These lenders also 
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benefit from the IFC’s ‘preferred creditor status’, reducing risks of default, while borrowers 
benefit from lower cost, longer tenor loans than would otherwise be available.  
 
The IDA funds its activities from donor finance, and is therefore not obliged to charge a 
market rate of interest to repay these funds. Finance is made available as grants, 
concessional loans (with very low or no interest rate) or a blend of these two. To qualify for 
IDA financing, countries must have gross national income (GNI) per capita below US$1,215. 
As well as per capita income, decisions on grant versus loan financing are based on country 
debt levels, as proportion of key variables, where higher debt ratios – ceteris paribus – 
means a greater proportion of grant finance may be made available.  
 
The World Bank has two basic types of lending instruments: investment loans and 
development policy loans. Flexible investment loans, which finance the production of goods 
and services to support economic and social development, can have maturities of up to      
35 years depending on the sector, though the average maturity of all loans will be 
considerably less than this, around 7–10 years. During the last two decades, investment 
operations accounted for around three-quarters of the Bank’s portfolio (World Bank 2011). In 
addition to grants and loans, the World Bank provides guarantees to promote private sector 
financing by covering risks that private investors normally are unwilling to cover, i.e. non-
commercial risk.  
 
Development policy loans are of shorter maturities and are: ‘quick-disbursing financing to 
support government policy and institutional reforms… for example, improving the 
management of public resources, strengthening the functioning of the judiciary, or promoting 
good governance’ (World Bank 2011: 76). In the past two decades, a quarter of the Bank’s 
portfolio has been of this form (ibid.).  
 
The World Bank (here referring to the IBRD and IDA) primarily lends (or provides grants) to 
governments, though under certain circumstances it will provide finance directly to projects 
and civil society organisations (CSOs). The IFC provides loans and equity finance to the 
private sector. Funds are disbursed in a number of formats. As well as providing finance as a 
solo institution, co-financing ‘is any arrangement under which funds from the Bank are 
associated with funds provided by sources from outside the recipient country for a specific 
lending project or program’ (World Bank 2011: 77). 
 
The World Bank also uses trust funds to disburse finance:  
 
Trust funds are financial arrangements between the World Bank and a donor or a 
group of donors under which the donor entrusts the Bank with funds for a specific 
development-related activity. Trust funds enable the Bank, along with bilateral and 
multilateral donors, to expand their response to specific needs, as in the case of 
fragile states or natural disasters or in support of global public goods. 
(World Bank 2011: 77)  
 
Trust funds are thus an important way of circumventing lending restrictions imposed by the 
size of the capital base.  
 
The IFC has a more complex range of investing mechanisms: asset-management services, 
providing short-term liquidity, making equity investments (IFC, always a minority 
shareholder, usually has anywhere from 5 per cent to 15 per cent or less of a company’s 
equity), investing in quasi-equity instruments and offering risk management products (i.e. 
derivatives of various kinds). 
 
The IBRD, IDA and IFC all offer technical assistance and advisory services either on a 
stand-alone basis, or in conjunction with their financial support.  
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The EIB provides: project loans, intermediated loans, venture capital, microfinance, equity 
and fund support, and blended finance. As with the IBRD and IFC, the EIB borrows funds 
from the capital markets (on good terms given its AAA credit rating) and so can make 
finance available on more favourable terms than would be possible for many of its 
borrowers, i.e. countries with a credit rating below this level.  
 
Most (around 90 per cent) of the EIB operations are within the EU; the remainder are to 
emerging and developing countries. 
 
Project loans are provided above a threshold of €25m. Loans can cover up to half of total 
project costs, but the average EIB share is a third of total financing. As well as lending to 
individual projects, the EIB provides multi-component loans to fund multi annual investment 
programmes using a single ‘framework loan’. This funds a range of projects in particular 
sectors, usually by a national or local public sector body, most frequently regarding 
infrastructure, energy efficiency/renewables, transport and urban renovation (EIB 2015a). 
While the average maturity all for EIB loans is perhaps 7–8 years – similar to the World Bank 
– infrastructure loans can go up to 25 or even 50 years (interview material). 
 
Intermediated loans are made to local financial institutions who lend on to one or more of the 
following: SMEs, mid- and large-cap businesses, local authorities, national administrations or 
other public sector bodies. To qualify for EIB financing, loans must further at least one of the 
following policy goals: increase growth and employment; promote economic and social 
cohesion by reducing inequalities; promote the knowledge economy; address skills gaps; 
link regional and national transport infrastructure; or enhance environmental sustainability, 
including climate-resilient growth.  
 
The EIB’s venture capital arm funds venture capital funds, as well as offering conditional and 
subordinated loans. These activities are managed by the EIF, which sets-up, manages and 
advises venture capital fund-of-funds, most of which are entrusted by third parties such as 
the EIB, the European Commission, the Member States and regional authorities. 
 
The microfinance work of the EIB was originally concentrated in the Africa, Pacific and 
Caribbean regions, which still account for 60 per cent of EIB microfinance activities. More 
recently, the EIB (and EIF) expanded microfinance operations into Mediterranean and 
European countries. Forty-three per cent of EIB microfinance support is in the form of direct 
loans to, and equity investment in, microfinance institutions (MFIs), while 54 per cent goes to 
microfinance investment intermediaries (MIVs), which operate as fund-of-funds, providing 
debt, equity, guarantees and technical assistance to MFIs.  
 
Through its equity and fund investments, the EIB seeks to stimulate and catalyse private 
capital in traditional and innovative segments that are not yet mainstream. Investments are 
concentrated on funds investing in the following EU priority areas: infrastructure and 
environment; carbon funds; urban areas; venture capital and private equity; energy efficiency 
and renewables; and ‘beyond the EU’ (i.e. the same regions that microfinance investment 
focuses on).  
 
The EIB also offers a wide, and increasing, range of blended finance instruments, within 
which EIB finance is combined with other sources, either public or private. Where EIB 
finance (or guarantees) is blended with private investment the aim is to improve the risk-
return profile of projects in key strategic areas,2 thereby increasing their attractiveness to 
private investors. For structured finance or project bonds, this might take the form of 
providing: loans or guarantees at particularly risky stages of projects (e.g. early stage); 
                                                            
2 Trans-European transport and energy networks, knowledge economy, energy and SMEs.  
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subordinated debt to attract senior debt; mezzanine financing; or derivative products to lower 
investor risk. These facilities also provide finance for innovation (InnovFin), to mitigate early 
stage risk in revenue-earning transport projects by guaranteeing cash flows (LGTT), flexible 
funding for SMEs (JEREMIE), to promote energy efficiency (PF4EE), and environmental 
protection (NCFF). These forms of blended facilities generally combine EIB resources with 
those from other parts of the EU. Under its Mutual Reliance Initiative (MRI), in contrast, the 
EIB works with the French Agency for Development (AFD) and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development Bank to coordinate and rationalise where they are all 
funders of the same international development project.  
 
Although the EIB offers quite a large number of blended finance facilities, these are all 
relatively new, with most being either still in the pilot phase, or having recently completed 
this. Their long-term effectiveness thus remains an open question, and will no doubt be a 
process of trial and error.  
 
The EIB does not provide economy-wide loans, like the World Bank (e.g. in crisis situations) 
but focuses on projects or sectors, as was the case with the World Bank in its earlier period. 
EIB loans do not therefore have such wide conditionality. Also, it is reportedly the case that 
EIB loans are processed more quickly than those from the World Bank (interview material), 
making them more attractive to borrowers, all else equal. This is, in part, related to their 
more agile way of implementing social and environmental standards, which is the subject of 
the next section.  
2.4 Social and environmental safeguards 
Over the course of decades of criticism for its role in supporting projects such as the Sardar 
Sarovar (Narmada River Valley) Dam Project and the large road project in the Amazon 
rainforest, the World Bank has developed detailed environmental and social safeguards 
(ESSs) in ten areas: environmental assessment, natural habitats, pest management, 
involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, forests, cultural resources, dam safety, 
international waterways, and projects in disputed areas (World Bank 2011).  
 
Prior to approval, all projects are screened for potential risks in each area, and where risks 
are identified borrowers must formulate approaches to mitigate them. Projects are assigned 
to the following categories. Category A: ‘A proposed project is classified as Category A if it is 
likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or 
unprecedented’. Category B: ‘A proposed project is classified as Category B if its potential 
adverse environmental impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas, 
including wetlands, forests, grasslands, and other natural habitats are less adverse than 
those of Category A projects’. Category C: ‘A proposed project is classified as Category C if 
it is likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts’. Category FI: ‘A proposed 
project is classified as Category FI if it involves investment of Bank funds through a financial 
intermediary, in subprojects that may result in adverse environmental impacts’ (World Bank 
2013). 
 
For higher risk projects, an Environmental Assessment (EA) is required prior to 
implementation. The EA should take:  
 
into account the natural environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; 
social aspects (involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and physical cultural 
resources); and trans-boundary and global environmental aspects… It also takes into 
account the variations in project and country conditions; the findings of country 
environmental studies; national environmental action plans; the country’s overall 
policy framework, national legislation, and institutional capabilities related to the 
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environment and social aspects; and obligations of the country, pertaining to project 
activities, under relevant international environmental treaties and agreements.  
(World Bank 2013) 
 
While it is the responsibility of the borrower to carry out the assessment, Category A projects 
require an independent panel to perform this function. The World Bank then reviews the 
recommendations arising from the process and makes funding decisions accordingly. 
 
Although CSOs and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (especially, but not only, from 
the lender countries), are wary of any attempt to weaken these safeguards, and some feel 
they do not go far enough, others believe that they have become so stringent as to 
discourage member nations from requesting World Bank loans (Marshall 2008). They have 
also been criticised for causing long delays in loan approval, which again may create a 
disincentive for borrowers. Furthermore, borrowing governments have complained often 
about the high transaction costs and delays introduced by safeguards. Partly in response to 
these criticisms, the World Bank has initiated a comprehensive consultation process to 
revise its ESSs, which is ongoing.  
 
A number of consultation documents have been disseminated, identifying key issues in each 
safeguard area and suggesting options for discussion during the consultation. For reasons of 
brevity it is not possible to go into these here, but some important reforms to the general 
framework that have been proposed are: first, a greater reliance on borrower countries’ own 
environmental and social policies, and a requirement on borrowers to undertake due 
diligence rather than the Bank; and second, a potential relaxation of the current requirement 
for EAs to be completed prior to project approval.3  
 
Unsurprisingly, the EIB’s approach to these issues reflects those of the EU, and is shaped 
by the need to comply with relevant EU Directives. From an environmental perspective, 
standards, principles and practices are documented in the European Principles for the 
Environment (EPE):  
 
The EPE covers projects in all EU Member States, the European Economic Area 
countries, the EU Accession, Candidate and potential Candidate Countries. In the 
Neighbourhood and Partner Countries, projects should comply with the appropriate 
EU environmental principles, practices and standards, subject to local conditions. For 
projects in these regions, the EPE will be applied with reference to local 
circumstances.  
(EIB 2015a: 1) 
 
As with the World Bank, potential EIB projects are scrutinised to determine whether an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), as per the EU Environment Impact Assessment 
Directive and Strategic Environmental Assessment, is required. Again, in a similar way to the 
Bank, projects are then classified based on the level of potential risk.  
 
Category A: Projects where EIA is mandatory. Category B: Projects for which the 
competent authority determines the need for an EIA according to specified criteria. 
Category C: Projects for which a limited environmental assessment is required 
according to any likely adverse environmental impacts of the project (projects outside 
the scope of the Directive). Category D: Projects for which no environmental 
assessment required.  
(EIB 2015a: 1) 
 
                                                            
3 For details of the ESS consultation process see: http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-
bank-safeguard-policies. 
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Projects financed by EIB are additionally screened for their impacts on sites of nature 
conservation and expected impacts on greenhouse gas emissions. For projects in water, 
sanitation and power, the EIB requires compliance with the EU Water Framework Directive 
and Large Combustive Plant Directive and also follows best practice international guidelines 
such as those produced by the World Commission on Dams and Extractive Industry Review 
of the World Bank. Finally, projects financed by EIB must also be compatible with multilateral 
environmental agreements to which the borrower is a signatory. Examples include the 
Montreal Protocol (on ozone depleting substances), the UN Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol (on greenhouse gas emissions) and the Aarhus Convention (on 
environmental information) (EIB 2015a). 
2.5 Monitoring and evaluation  
The World Bank Group has two principle forms of internal impact evaluation. The 
Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) unit of the World Bank, and the Development 
Outcome Tracking System (DOTS) of the IFC.  
 
DIME’s mandate is to generate high-quality and operationally relevant impact evaluation 
research to transform development policy. DIME’s objectives are to increase the use of 
impact evaluation in the design and implementation of public policy, improve the quality of 
the World Bank’s operations, strengthen country institutions for evidence-based 
policymaking, and generate knowledge in strategic development areas.  
 
DIME’s portfolio is comprised of 175 ongoing evaluations in 47 countries, with the following 
sector allocations: agriculture (20 per cent); industry and competitiveness (10 per cent); 
finance and markets (6 per cent); transport and information and communications technology 
(ICT) (5 per cent); education (11 per cent); health, nutrition and population (11 per cent); 
social protection and labour (3 per cent); energy and extractives (3 per cent); environment 
and natural resources (1 per cent); social, urban, rural and resilience (13 per cent); 
governance (9 per cent); and water (3 per cent).  
 
Evaluations use a range of evaluation methodologies, from experimental, quasi-experimental 
to theory-based, to seek answers to policy-relevant questions (e.g. what is the impact of a 
three-month job training programme on the probability of employment for unemployed 
youth?). As well as ‘what’ questions like this, DIME also poses ‘why’ questions to understand 
the mechanisms through which particular interventions succeed or not (e.g. what was the 
behavioural response to the intervention?). 
 
The DOTS system of the IFC was launched in 2005 and is integrated into each stage of its 
project cycle, allowing – in principle – ‘real-time’ monitoring of development outcomes. The 
IFC describes this process with respect to investment as follows: At the outset of a project, 
IFC’s staff members identify standardised indicators with baselines and targets. They track 
progress throughout supervision, which allows for real-time feedback into operations, until 
project closure. For investments, the overall DOTS score is a synthesis of four performance 
categories that are informed by standardised industry-specific indicators. To obtain a positive 
rating, a project must make a contribution to the host country’s development.  
 
Monitoring the impact of the advisory project cycle is necessarily different. For the IFC, here 
the overall DOTS score or development-effectiveness rating is a synthesis of the overall 
strategic relevance, effectiveness (as measured by project outputs, outcomes, and impacts), 
and efficiency of the services. At project completion, intended results are compared with 
achieved results. Some results – medium-term outcomes and longer-term impacts – may be 
unknown at project completion but can be examined post-completion.  
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As well as these internal impact assessments, the World Bank Group has established 
mechanisms that are independent of their project management structures. In 1973, the 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) was established to assess the impact of projects and 
report directly to the Board. The IEG has a broad mandate to assess project feasibility, 
project planning and sustainable completion, and finally to analyse the impact on the 
borrower nations’ overall development (Marshall 2008). 
 
Another body, the Inspection Panel, was established in 1993 to review complaints from 
groups who feel adversely affected by Bank-supported projects. The Inspection Panel is 
independent of World Bank management and staff and reports directly to the Board of 
Executive Directors. The Panel consists of three members appointed on a non-renewable 
five-year term by the Board. The approach followed by the Inspection Panel has been 
referred to as ‘accountability from below’ as it is designed to give voice to the presumed 
beneficiaries against the potential negative impacts of projects (ibid.). Inspections focus on 
the potential or actual harms that are linked with the Bank’s failures to meet its own ESS 
policies, and hold the World Bank as an institution, rather than any individual, to account. 
During 2015, the Panel received nine complaints from projects in Ethiopia, India, Kenya, 
Nepal, Nigeria, and Paraguay (World Bank 2015).4 
 
The monitoring and evaluation activities of the EIB are situated within the Operations 
Evaluation (EV) function, which has a mandate to carry out ex-post evaluations of financed 
projects. As stated in the terms of reference of the Operations Evaluation Group: ‘EV 
focuses on the quality and the results of the EIB Group’s operations within the framework of 
relevant EU policies (the Treaty, Directives, Council Decisions, Mandates, etc.) and the 
decisions of the EIB Governors’ (EIB 2009). 
 
The EV evaluates a representative sample of projects (sector, country, etc.) on a thematic 
basis. It is responsible to see if the projects comply with EU policies/Directives for the 
concerned themes or sectors and national policy objectives of the member nations. The 
overriding goal is to improve operational performance, accountability and transparency by 
better understanding what works and what does not (EIB 2009).  
 
The EV reports directly to the EIB Management Committee, and independence is actively 
promoted by policies such as staff rotation, separate budget approvals and guidelines in 
case conflict of interest arises. A brief snapshot of the stages of the evaluation process is 
given below: 
 
 A rolling ‘work programme’, designed to cover a representative range of projects 
across EIB themes, is established in consultation with the Directorates (EIB 
Departments), the Management Committee and the Board of Directors, which takes 
the final decision.  
 Evaluations usually take place in the second half of project-cycles, normally one or 
two years after projects have started or post project-completion.  
 Project evaluations assess financial and non-financial impacts and also review EIB’s 
role in managing the project to ensure that the specified policies and procedures 
were followed. 
 Evaluation reports are created based on primary and secondary information which 
includes: existing EIB documentation on theme, site visits, discussions with 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders. Before finalisation, Directorates receive a copy 
of this report. In some cases, clients also receive a copy at this point.  
                                                            
4 The World Bank has two further bodies that are responsible for financial fraud detection and improving the operational 
efficiency of the Group: the Integrity Vice Presidency has the responsibility to detect and deter fraud and corruption in financed 
projects, and the Internal Audit Vice-Presidency (IAD) has an independent and objective assurance advisory function to 
improve the Group’s operations. ‘IAD primarily focuses on assessing whether governance, risk management, and control 
processes of the Bank Group are effective in achieving the organization’s goals’ (World Bank 2015: 28). 
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 A synthesis of many such evaluations is presented to the Board and Management 
Committee for review and evaluations can also be accessed by EIB staff, internal 
decision-makers and externally via the EIB website (EIB 2009). 
 
In this section we have summarised some of the key features of the World Bank and EIB, 
including how these have evolved historically. In Section 3 we turn to the AIIB and consider 
what the new MDB can learn from these experiences. This is followed by an analysis of what 
the international development community may, in time, learn from the AIIB.  
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3 Overview of the AIIB’s Articles of 
Agreement, aims and ‘additionality’ 
 
Before considering operational options in key areas for the AIIB, we first examine what is 
already established. As the AIIB has not yet begun operations, we are dependent on 
published material such as the Articles of Agreement and statements about AIIB aims from 
key policymakers. In the light of this, the section concludes with a brief discussion about the 
rationale for a new MDB, and what ‘additionality’ the AIIB may bring to the multilateral 
development financing landscape.  
3.1 Articles of Agreement 
The AIIB’s Articles of Agreement describe some important features. As well as reproducing 
the relevant text, this section provides some commentary based on interviews with senior 
development bank officials, and the review of the approaches taken by the World Bank and 
EIB presented above. 
 
The purpose of the AIIB shall be to: (i) foster sustainable economic development, 
create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in 
infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii) promote regional cooperation and 
partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration 
with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions. Wherever used in this 
Agreement, references to ‘Asia’ and ‘region’ shall include the geographical regions 
and composition classified as Asia and Oceania by the United Nations. 
 
Given its name, it is unsurprising that the AIIB’s mandate focuses on infrastructure in Asia. 
Reportedly, however, there will be some exceptions, such as lending to its extra-regional 
developing and emerging country members, such as South Africa, Brazil and Egypt 
(interview material). 
 
To implement this mandate, the AIIB will seek: 
 
(i) to promote investment in the region of public and private capital for development 
purposes, in particular for development of infrastructure and other productive sectors;  
(ii) to utilize the resources at its disposal for financing such development in the 
region, including those projects and programs which will contribute most effectively to 
the harmonious economic growth of the region as a whole and having special regard 
to the needs of less developed members in the region; (iii) to encourage private 
investment in projects, enterprises and activities contributing to economic 
development in the region, in particular in infrastructure and other productive sectors, 
and to supplement private investment when private capital is not available on 
reasonable terms and conditions; and (iv) to undertake such other activities and 
services as may further these functions. 
 
More specifically:  
 
The Bank may carry out its operations in any of the following ways:  
 
i.  by making, co-financing or participating in direct loans;  
ii.  by investment of funds in the equity capital of an institution or enterprise;  
iii.  by guaranteeing, in whole or in part, loans for economic development;  
iv. by deploying Special Funds resources;  
v by providing technical assistance;  
vi  through other types of financing as may be determined by the Board of 
Governors. 
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This is broad enough in scope to enable the AIIB to proceed flexibly in its use of different 
instruments and activities. The ability to use ‘special fund resources’ matches the World 
Bank’s use of trust funds, and will enable the AIIB to expand lending beyond the restrictions 
of its capital base if member countries have the desire and capacity to provide additional 
resources. Given the scale of the infrastructure funding gap, this is a very welcome move.  
 
For membership: 
 
Membership in the Bank shall be open to all members of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development or the Asian Development Bank. A distinction is 
made between regional members and other members, called non-regional members. 
Regional members should have seventy-five per cent of the total subscribed capital 
stock, unless otherwise agreed by the Board of Governors by a Super Majority vote. 
 
The stipulation that three-quarters of voting rights are reserved for regional members is 
interesting. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has a similar provision, ensuring regional 
countries maintain a voting majority.  
 
The authorized initial capital stock of the Bank shall be one hundred billion United 
States dollars. The original authorized capital stock shall be divided into paid-in 
shares and callable shares. Shares having an aggregate par value of twenty billion 
dollars shall be paid-in shares, and shares having an aggregate par value of eighty 
billion dollars shall be callable. The authorized capital stock of the AIIB may be 
increased by the Board of Governors, by a Super Majority vote. Payment of the 
amount initially subscribed by each Signatory to this Agreement which becomes a 
member to the paid-in capital stock of the Bank shall be made in five yearly 
installments, of twenty per cent each of such amount, except members considered 
less developed countries, which can make their contribution in ten yearly 
installments. 
 
In terms of scale of capital, therefore, the AIIB at the outset will be around a third of the size 
of the World Bank and EIB. As with the World Bank, 20 per cent of subscribed capital will be 
paid in, giving the AIIB US$20bn of useable capital at the outset. The implications of this for 
the scale of lending that we might expect, and how this is likely to evolve over time, are 
considered in detail below.  
 
The total amount outstanding of loans, equity investments, guarantees and other 
types of financing provided by the Bank in its ordinary operations shall not at any 
time be increased, if by such increase the total amount of its unimpaired subscribed 
capital, reserves and retained earnings included in its ordinary resources would be 
exceeded. 
 
This establishes a leverage ratio of 1:1, the same as the World Bank. As the AIIB will start 
with no reserves or retained earnings, this sets a limit of US$100bn of total lending given 
current capital levels. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the Board of Governors may, by a Super Majority vote 
determine that, based on the Bank’s financial position and financial standing, the 
limitation may be increased, up to 250 per cent of the Bank’s unimpaired subscribed 
capital, reserves and retained earnings included in its ordinary resources. 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that provision is made to relax this requirement, where assets may 
increase to 2.5 times this level, in line with the limit used by the EIB. This seems very 
positive, as such a strict 1:1 ratio of total capital to total loans is seen as too constraining 
today (see more discussion below). 
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The Bank shall place no restriction upon the procurement of goods and services from 
any country from the proceeds of any financing undertaken in the ordinary or special 
operations of the Bank. 
 
This is a very enlightened provision, which bodes well for the efficiency of its operations, as it 
means goods and services from AIIB-funded projects can be provided by any country, 
whether they are members of the AIIB or not. (However, the EIB experience shows there 
may be problems with countries requiring local content, based on interview material. Indeed, 
some emerging and developing countries require a certain percentage of local content due 
to, for example, reasons of technological development; this may need to be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis). 
 
A similar point can be made regarding staff, which may be nationals of any country, even 
those who are not members of the AIIB, with appointments made on a meritocratic basis 
(interview material). Again, this is a valuable measure. It will not only enhance technical 
capacity of the staff, which is crucial, but may even help ensure the highest credit rating. It is 
noteworthy that the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (a smaller bank than the AIIB, 
but also a new one) allows for permanent contracts of citizens of non-member states, which 
reportedly helped the bank achieve a good rating (interview material). 
 
The Board of Directors shall function on a non-resident basis except as otherwise 
decided by the Board of Governors by a Super Majority vote. 
 
This differs from the World Bank, which has a resident Board of Directors, but is similar to 
the EIB and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), both of which have a non-
resident Board. The non-resident model, which the AIIB is adopting, may have advantages 
in terms of facilitating speedier approval of projects and lowering costs of operations.  
 
The total voting power of each country member shall consist of the sum of its basic 
votes, share votes and, in the case of a Founding Member, its Founding Member 
votes.  
 
i.  The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results 
from the equal distribution among all the members of twelve (12) per cent of 
the aggregate sum of the basic votes, share votes and Founding Member 
votes of all the members.  
ii.  The number of the share votes of each member shall be equal to the number 
of shares of the capital stock of the Bank held by that member.  
iii.  Each Founding Member shall be allocated six hundred (600) Founding 
Member votes. 
3.2 Aims and additionality 
The more specific aims of the AIIB have been spelled out in several speeches and 
interviews by Mr Jin Liqun, President-designate (see for example, Xinhuanet, 25 December 
2015): the AIIB should be lean (avoid over-staffing and excessive bureaucracy, with few 
layers of management, and a non-resident Board), mean (zero tolerance for corruption), and 
green (encourage sustainable development through investments in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency). These seem very sensible objectives, emphasising the importance of 
speed of operations, which is a major priority for borrowers, and an important criticism by 
borrowing governments of many existing MDBs.  
 
It is important to note, however, that there may be trade-offs involved in some of these aims; 
for example, the aim of speed could in some cases conflict with the quality of projects, 
including from a social and environmental perspective. While these risks can be mitigated 
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through the use of high-quality and experienced staff in the AIIB, and learning the lessons 
(both positive and negative) from the experience of existing multilateral, regional and 
national development banks (especially successful ones, such as the Chinese Development 
Bank (CDB) and KfW), it is important that they are acknowledged and actively addressed.  
 
Ideally, the aim should be to maximise speed of operations without reducing the scale of 
development impact and quality of social and environmental outcomes. This is a critically 
important area where the AIIB could bring real additionality. By commencing operations, the 
AIIB will automatically increase the quantity of investment in infrastructure. If it can also 
accelerate the investment process this quantity affect will be amplified, particularly if other 
MDBs can learn from its innovations. If it can achieve this while also maintaining, or even 
enhancing the quality of projects, the positive development impacts will be huge.  
 
As mentioned previously, the fact that the World Bank is currently reviewing its approach to 
environmental and social standards, suggests a window of opportunity for the AIIB to work in 
conjunction with existing MDBs to co-construct best practice in this area over time. As the 
AIIB will reportedly co-invest with the World Bank in its early years, this is very possible in 
practical terms.  
 
The philosophy that seems to be emerging for the AIIB suggests scope for constructive 
collaboration. Reportedly, the AIIB’s goal is for the environmental and social standards of 
projects to be high, but also consistent with the development needs of borrowing countries, 
i.e. not excessively onerous and time-consuming. Furthermore, there seems to be an 
acceptance for greater flexibility needed for poorer countries. This seems likely to lead to a 
greater reliance on countries’ own systems for ensuring that safeguards are met, which also 
appears to be the direction that the World Bank is taking in its own ESS reform process. The 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) is adopting a similar approach.  
 
Moving from a requirement of ex-ante environmental and social standard requirements 
towards ex-post monitoring mechanisms is likely to increase speed and lower costs, a highly 
desirable aim from a borrowers’ perspective. A focus on development outcomes is also in 
line with the ‘programme for results’ initiatives piloted by the World Bank in 2010, which 
disburses finance on the basis of agreed development results rather than project inputs. In 
this regard, targeted development results should include environmental and social 
outcomes. In principle, such an approach could spur innovation, leading to better 
development outcomes, fewer delays and lower costs.  
 
As ever, the devil will be in the detail. While this approach has the potential to create a 
valuable ‘race to the top’, it also runs the risk of standards being sacrificed to accelerate 
investment cycles and lower costs. Careful coordination and cooperation between MDBs, 
governments and other development actors such as CSOs, NGOs and academic 
researchers would be needed to ensure that this does not happen. Such an approach may 
also not be suitable for the most high-risk projects, where traditional safeguards would still 
need to be applied.  
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4 Investment criteria and choice of 
instruments 
4.1 Sector and project investment criteria 
The AIIB’s focus is infrastructure, and there is very good evidence to support this in terms of 
maximising development impacts. As we saw in Section 2, infrastructure was also the 
largest sector for both the World Bank and EIB in their early period. Since then the World 
Bank has progressively diversified into other sectors, reducing the proportion of lending 
going to infrastructure. This has been criticised by several borrowing countries and by some 
development experts, leading to some renewed emphasis of the World Bank on 
infrastructure. The EIB, in contrast, has kept roughly the same weighting over time.  
 
Other than the fact that it is called the ‘infrastructure’ investment bank, there is no intrinsic 
reason why the AIIB should take either route. Infrastructure can certainly deliver large 
development returns, but so can other sectors. The funding gap in infrastructure, however, is 
particularly large, and certainly for the foreseeable future, there is a strong case for an MDB 
that is fully dedicated to the sector in Asia. This would also make sense in terms of the 
accumulation of knowledge: infrastructure investment has its own distinctive features, and a 
specialised institution may be better placed to become a centre for knowledge accumulation 
and dissemination than a more diversified bank. Looked at from the perspective of the global 
development finance landscape, specialisation would need to be complemented by other 
MDBs specialising more in other developmentally important sectors.  
 
When considering which sectors and sub-sectors to invest in more generally, it is important 
to choose those that have the potential for development impact and ensure sufficient 
commercial return to the development bank. ‘Sufficient returns’ are those which enable the 
bank to maintain its capital base and ideally accrue retained earnings. Put another way, the 
bank needs to make rather than lose money, but it does not need to maximise the amount of 
money it makes. The emphasis should be on maximising development returns not financial 
returns. Development banks should also take the long-view, prioritising sectors which yield 
the highest development returns over the longer term. After sectors have been selected on 
this basis, projects within prioritised sectors should be scrutinised for both potential 
development impact and their ability to generate positive financial returns.  
 
The assessment of potential development impacts, at both the sector and project level, can 
first draw upon the extensive academic and policy literatures that have developed over the 
decades, including analysis of backward and forward linkages impact of investment and 
participatory methodologies that have been developed to give intended beneficiaries and 
other affected parties voice. The experience, and accumulated institutional knowledge, of 
existing MDBs, as well as successful national development banks, such as the CDB and 
KfW, is also an invaluable source for a new institution such as the AIIB.  
 
Over time, however, the AIIB will be best served by developing its own capacity, where the 
prioritisation of sectors is based on its own impact evaluation of AIIB projects. As well as 
enabling the AIIB to enhance its development impacts, this would also create a valuable 
resource that other MDBs could use, amplifying these effects. The concept of the AIIB as a 
‘knowledge bank’ is discussed in detail in Section 6.  
 
Ensuring projects can generate positive financial returns requires not just careful 
consideration of whether it has the potential to operate commercially, but also debt 
sustainability analysis, to ensure projects and countries are able to pay back loans. Here the 
history of lending by institutions like the World Bank, as well as the regional development 
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banks (RDBs) (which suffered quite important losses, reflected in the Debt Initiative for 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPIC)) suggests the AIIB should undertake careful debt 
sustainability analysis to avoid excessive future losses. Clearly not all losses can be 
avoided, but a rigorous analysis should aim to forecast and avoid expected losses.  
According to Matthias Kollatz, drawing on his extensive experience as Senior Vice President 
of the EIB, a useful lesson from the past is to ask for real guarantees, such as pledges of 
rolling stock, plots or buildings, including guarantees from regional authorities, to align their 
interest in the economic success of the project.  
 
Though commercial profitability should not be the main aim of a development bank, any 
profits the AIIB makes can be added to its capital base, enabling higher future lending, and 
therefore potentially greater development impact in future years. Since their initial capital 
endowment at the time of their creation, both the World Bank and the EIB (as well as other 
development banks) have largely increased their capital and lending capacity in this way.  
 
As ever, the key is to strike the right balance. Too much focus on financial returns risks 
achieving less development impact than could be achieved. On the other hand, paying 
insufficient attention to financial returns risks reducing the resources available for future 
lending, and therefore reduces the potential development impacts that could be achieved in 
the future.  
4.2 Investment instruments 
As regards the most effective financial instruments for funding infrastructure, valuable 
lessons can be extracted from the experience of existing MDBs. Reflecting the size of 
infrastructure projects, the greatest need is for large-scale, affordable, long-term loans, and 
for equity instruments to reach appropriate debt-equity ratios for infrastructure (normally 
around 60:40). Guarantees are also being demanded increasingly by the private sector to 
mitigate risk, and MDBs have an important role to play in this respect, though there are 
some caveats, as discussed below.  
 
In infrastructure, three parameters (maturity, scale and cost) are therefore simultaneously 
crucial, as the required up-front investment is normally high, the construction period can be 
very long, and the time required before the project becomes commercially profitable is often 
long. The cost of finance is important as this will ultimately be paid by users as tariffs, or 
governments as subsidies. Expensive finance for infrastructure projects is thus likely to lower 
potential development impacts, either directly by undermining affordability for poorer groups, 
or indirectly by reducing the resources available to government for other types of 
developmentally important expenditure. This is why financing by public banks and/or 
governments is so needed, as large-scale, affordable, long-term, private finance is very 
scarce, particularly in developing countries. 
 
An important criterion for choosing the mix of instruments is that they should facilitate rapid 
and significant financing of infrastructure. As we have seen, the President of the AIIB has 
rightly emphasised the need for speed in arranging funding. Another criterion is that, since 
the capital of MDBs like the AIIB originates in the savings of shareholder governments (and 
therefore of their citizens) unnecessary financial risks (and therefore excessive public 
contingent liabilities) should not be created. Though this may restrict somewhat the capacity 
of the AIIB to leverage its capital by very large numbers in the short term, it will reduce future 
risks to its capital and profitability in the future. Rather than excel in ‘financial engineering’ – 
as the private financial sector has, which has often resulted in the creation of excessive 
systemic risk, sometimes leading to developmentally costly financial crises – MDBs such as 
the AIIB and the New Development Bank (NDB) should excel in real engineering, to support 
countries and regions design and develop good infrastructure projects. Indeed, especially in 
their earlier phases, this is exactly what the World Bank and the EIB have done. 
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To fulfil these two criteria, simple instruments, such as ‘plain vanilla’ loans may be most 
appropriate, especially for a new MDB just beginning operations, such as the AIIB, as they 
will allow a rapid ramping-up of lending and investing in infrastructure, as well as minimise 
risks for the MDB. If a new MDB like the AIIB can establish a good asset book based on 
clear, understandable instruments, a good repayment record on it loans, and a strong 
decision-making process, it has the potential to achieve a better rating than the average (or 
weighted average) of its shareholders. This is the case with institutions like the World Bank, 
and the EIB, which both have AAA rating, even though many of their member governments 
do not. Building on this higher rating, the AIIB could provide cheaper financing to projects in 
member countries compared with their issuing sovereign bonds, for example.  
 
To achieve greater leverage over time, other instruments, such as guarantees to private 
investors and lenders, will need to be developed to complement loan instruments. 
Guarantees are safer from a development bank perspective if they are at least partly funded 
ex-ante, and if the risks for which guarantees are provided are clearly capped; as we discuss 
below, risks are not open-ended (see also Griffith-Jones and Kollatz 2015). 
 
As well as providing guarantees, development banks like the AIIB can also attract private 
investment by creating a ‘demonstration effect’, showcasing successful and profitable 
investments in developing and emerging economies that they have funded, and indirectly 
encouraging private investors. This has been the case both with IFC and Norfund, the latter 
experience discussed in Spratt, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2013). 
 
There is a strong case for a predominance of simple instruments, such as long-term lending, 
co-financed by private lending and equity. Alternative instruments, which potentially can 
provide more leverage, are complicated to arrange, and may actually deliver very few 
transactions, and thus very little volume, as has been the experience of other MDBs such as 
the World Bank and EIB (based on interview material; see also Griffith-Jones and Kollatz 
2015). Furthermore, they may force public development banks like the AIIB to take 
excessive risks. Finally, transactional costs tend to be higher with structured loans or other 
more complex instruments, so it seems clear that when using such instruments, small 
projects should be avoided. Therefore, an initial focus should be ‘plain vanilla’ lending. 
However, there is a case to introduce some more sophisticated instruments on an 
experimental basis, to learn from experience, and to scale them up – if successful – in a later 
stage.  
 
Interviews carried out show that the limiting instruments for infrastructure finance are long-
term loans and equity. As regards the balance between debt and equity, the overwhelming 
majority of AIIB financing should be provided through debt. To continue to increase their 
impact over time, development banks need to project and grow their capital base. Equity is 
inherently riskier than debt, hence its higher returns, and is therefore more suited to private 
than public investors, particularly at large scales. 
 
This is not always the case of course. There will be cases where the provision of some 
equity or guarantees against certain specified risks is important to provide comfort to the 
private investor in infrastructure. Two caveats are needed. If risks are assumed, for example 
through guarantees, these should be clearly specified. Typically, as with MIGA, they should 
not involve commercial risk, but focus more on areas like regulatory risk, which is more 
clearly linked to government actions. Equity can also have the advantage that if, in good and 
profitable projects, it leads to higher profits for the AIIB, which can then be used for future 
capital increases, and increased activity, as was the case with Deutsche Investitions- und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), part of the KfW Group, for example (interview material). 
 
One sector of great importance for sustainable development (a focus for both the AIIB and 
NDB) is renewable energy. Regulatory risks are perceived to be particularly high in this 
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sector as regulations or broader policies, such as feed-in tariffs often need to be maintained 
for long periods to ensure the commercial viability of projects. Governments or development 
banks such as the AIIB are very well placed to provide guarantees against such risks, not 
least as they may be able to mitigate these risks through their influence on governments. 
International infrastructure projects, which involve several countries, may also require 
guarantees from an MDB like the AIIB, especially on regulatory aspects, which generally 
differ between countries (interview material). 
 
Beyond guarantees, other routes can be found to provide comfort to private investors. 
According to interviews with private investors and lenders, one such important route is co-
investment or co-lending by one or more multilateral or regional public development bank. 
What seems to count most is not how much the development bank is involved or through 
what modality, but the fact that it is involved at all – the so-called ‘halo effect’. The ‘halo 
effect’ is often significant, not least as investors may suspect, probably correctly, that a 
default is less likely if a major MDB is a co-investor (see Spratt and Ryan-Collins 2012 for a 
discussion of this issue). 
 
A particularly useful mechanism in infrastructure is co-financing for the initial (construction) 
or later periods of loans, where private finance is hard to obtain. For the former, support can 
be an intervention (e.g. partial guarantee or equity contribution) to support the construction 
phase, thus covering quite significant construction risk. Another option for development 
banks would be to support the project preparation phase, enabling more projects to be 
investment ready by the time they are brought to market. For later stages, development bank 
finance could be phased in when the commercial lending ends, enabling the tenor of the 
loans to be extended beyond the period that the private banks are willing to lend. These 
types of instruments have been used extensively by the World Bank and EIB, so useful 
lessons can be drawn from their experience on the details of design and implementation. 
 
Another important function, especially in regional projects, can be provided by larger 
countries helping smaller ones, on occasions with the technical support of a development 
bank. More generally, MDBs often provide coordination services, again especially in regional 
projects. Examples include making regulations compatible across countries, or facilitating 
negotiations about electricity prices. (For an example of the role played by the World Bank in 
Mozambique and neighbouring countries in relation to large hydropower plant, see Spratt et 
al. 2013). MDBs are well placed to facilitate such collaboration between larger and smaller 
member countries. 
 
Smaller projects (infrastructure at the municipal level, for example) may find it particularly 
difficult to raise private finance. In such cases, the AIIB, like other MDBs, needs to find the 
least cost financing mechanism; this relates not just to instruments, but to institutional 
approaches and modalities. For example, a new instrument may be desirable, in which 
similar projects being carried out in similar periods but different locations, are grouped 
together. The AIIB could collaborate with public or private banks specialised in financing 
municipalities, or with national development banks, to which it could provide credit lines for 
this purpose. The input of the AIIB could consist of three elements: risk taking, technical 
assistance in due diligence and the effort of standardisation. 
 
As mentioned above, there is a growing interest in unfunded instruments such as 
guarantees; this interest originates especially from the private sector (which is always 
looking to minimise its risk exposure in infrastructure). Some experts from development 
banks also favour such instruments, in the belief that guarantees allow a more ‘efficient’ use 
of capital. However, as reported in Griffith-Jones and Kollatz 2015, though a lot has been 
written about guarantees, not a lot of financing for infrastructure has actually occurred 
through this mechanism. Between 1994 and 2013, for example, the World Bank provided 
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only around 50 guarantees, the ADB and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
hardly any, and the AfDB none at all. 
 
It is therefore reasonable to be somewhat sceptical about the very generalised use of 
guarantee instruments, both due to practical difficulties (reflected in the low numbers of 
cases), and the large scale of contingent liabilities they generate, whilst offering no potential 
for the public banks like the AIIB to capture any upside. However, in some cases, 
guarantees (especially partial ones) can provide initial confidence for private investors to 
enter a new sector, or country, with following projects of a similar nature being undertaken 
by investors without development bank guarantees. 
 
Guarantees against risks should be clearly limited, to avoid unlimited contingent liabilities 
being assumed by the AIIB. It is also important to fund guarantees at least partly ex-ante as 
problems tend to arise, and guarantees are called, when crises occur, a time when it may be 
harder for MDBs to raise resources on the markets or from governments. Stress analysis 
may be useful to develop if there are a significant number of guarantees being considered, 
which could include a certain percentage of guarantees being called under a situation where 
the access to the capital markets might be difficult – and therefore a liquidity buffer with 
some pre-funding would be prudent.  
 
The experience of the EIB, and other development banks, indicates that guarantees are 
better suited if given to a portfolio of, for example, SMEs, diversifying idiosyncratic risks, 
except in extreme crises situations. For infrastructure, with fewer and larger projects, 
idiosyncratic risk (if one or two very big projects fail) may have a major impact on any 
contingent liabilities. Guarantees for infrastructure are thus far riskier for MDBs than 
guarantees against first losses for a diversified set of SMEs. If guarantees are given for 
infrastructure, the need to pre-fund a fairly high proportion is thus advisable. 
 
An important innovation that the AIIB could help pioneer are loan instruments that allow an 
upside for the development bank, if a project is successful. This would generate profits that 
would be reinvested, increasing lending in the future. Such instruments have been discussed 
amply in the literature, and even suggested specifically for the EIF, linked to the EIB (Griffith-
Jones 1993), but have not been implemented. The renewed interest in GDP-linked bonds for 
sovereign debt (e.g. by the Bank of England) is making the case that state-contingent loans 
(linked to state of the wider economy, or in the case of infrastructure projects, to revenue 
streams) are innovative instruments of value, as they reduce likelihood of default in bad 
times and capture the upside in good times. 
 
If the AIIB contributes equity through capital or guarantees (and assumes risks), it should 
also benefit from the upside. This implies if the project were to be particularly profitable, 
a proportional part of the profits would be paid to it. One could establish the capital injection 
with a pari passu participation of the profits for a certain period of time, for example, or a 
permanent share of the project company for the future. This interesting innovation, which 
could increase the ability of the AIIB to generate greater revenue, would add to existing 
equity capital and thus increase its future lending capacity. Such a developmentally positive 
innovation could then be also used by other MDBs.  
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5 Scale of capital and likely level of loans 
 
One of the key questions asked is whether the AIIB will make a significant contribution to the 
massive infrastructure deficit existing in Asia, by providing meaningful levels of funding, and 
to what extent the scale of lending to be provided by the AIIB is comparable to existing 
development banks. 
 
It is possible to estimate the level of lending that the AIIB will reach in the following 5–10 
years. A first important indication was provided in December 2015 by President-designate 
Liqun, when he indicated that the AIIB was expected to lend between US$10–$15bn a year 
during the next five to six years; this lending would be cumulative, as initially there would be 
no repayments, as loans would be of long maturity. In five years, one could expect therefore 
a stock of loans of about US$50–$75bn, which would be a significant amount.  
 
We can do a more detailed calculation of the possible level of total stock of lending by the 
AIIB by 2025. This would be determined by the level of paid-in capital, expected profits 
(which can be accumulated as reserves or additional capital), as well as maximum leverage 
of loans over paid-in capital. The total level of committed paid-in capital in late 2015 was 
US$19.6bn (of a total of initial authorised capital of US$20bn). This will be contributed in five 
equal instalments on a yearly basis. President-designate Liqun has also indicated clearly (in 
his speech at Brookings), that the leverage of paid-in capital should be no more than five, i.e. 
that paid-in capital should represent not less than 20 per cent of total loans. It is interesting 
that this is the same as the new loan to paid-in capital ratio of 20 per cent announced by the 
World Bank in 2014, which is lower than the ratio used in previous years by the World Bank, 
which was over 30 per cent in the 2009–13 period.  
 
Following Humphreys (2015), we assume a return on equity of the AIIB in the next ten years 
of 3.5 per cent, which represents the average return of the IBRD, the IADB, the ADB and the 
AfDB in the 2009–13 period, starting in the third year of operations of the bank, and that all 
profits are reinvested as reserves or capital increases, which is the traditional practice of 
existing MDBs. This, together with the other parameters described in the preceding 
paragraph implies that in 2025, the total level of accumulated loans by the AIIB could reach 
over US$120bn. We are assuming here there would be no repayments of loans yet. This 
stock of lending would be higher than that of any of the RDBs in 2014, such as the ADB, the 
IADB or the AfDB, and would be almost as high as the total stock of lending by the IBRD 
part of the World Bank in 2014, which reached over US$140bn. If we were just to consider 
only infrastructure lending (which by 2025 is likely to still be 100 per cent of AIIB lending), 
whereas it is less than 40 per cent for the World Bank in the 2010s, the total stock of 
infrastructure lending of the AIIB in 2025 could be significantly higher than IBRD stock of 
lending in infrastructure in 2014 (ibid.). 
 
What is clear from these estimates is that by 2025 the AIIB could be a very major actor in 
funding infrastructure in Asia, and perhaps more importantly, could be making a significant 
contribution to the financing of the large deficit in infrastructure existing in Asia, and thus 
making a valuable contribution to inclusive and sustainable growth in that region. 
 
Naturally, the impact will be enhanced if, as planned by the AIIB and following in the 
footsteps of the existing MDBs and RDBs, the AIIB would co-finance projects with private 
lenders and investors, as well as national development banks of the borrowing countries. If 
such co-financing follows the classical path of at least 50 per cent of co-financing by other 
parties (as for example required by the EIB, as a minimum, though often its projects have 
only one third participation of EIB resources), then the total stock of loans of the AIIB plus 
this private co-financing by 2025 could reach over US$240bn. 
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Furthermore, especially in its initial years, the AIIB is planning to co-finance loans particularly 
with the World Bank and the ADB (interview material). Therefore, the total scale of 
infrastructure projects by 2025 in which the AIIB had contributed lending could exceed, 
possibly quite significantly, US$240bn by 2025. 
 
As discussed above, the scale of AIIB lending could be significantly enhanced through 
special or trust funds, mechanisms also used by institutions such as the World Bank and 
RDBs. Thus if a member country, or countries, wanted to further expand their lending or 
other financial contribution to infrastructure projects, they could create special funds, a 
possibility which is specified in the Articles of Agreement (see Section 3). Such special funds 
could have a general purpose, or perhaps be focused on specific sectors, such as solar 
energy, for example, or special categories of countries, such as low-income countries. 
Though such special funds may have less clear governance structures, they do have the 
virtue of allowing an expansion of financial activity, and especially lending – but also others, 
such as technical assistance – without requiring further capital increases. Naturally, if the 
capital of the AIIB was further increased at a later stage, and there are reportedly 20 new 
member countries interested in joining, this could lead also to potential further increases in 
AIIB lending. 
 
Some caveats should be added here. To achieve this scale of lending by the AIIB will require 
sufficient demand for such loans; furthermore, the quality of the projects needs to be of a 
sufficiently high standard, to both ensure high development impacts and loan repayment, 
both by projects and countries. When presented projects are not of sufficient quality, they 
may require technical assistance by the AIIB to improve them. This may be a time-
consuming, though valuable exercise. Finally, the need to evaluate such projects, as well as 
possibly provide technical assistance in the design of some of them – especially the more 
complex and international ones, and particularly in countries with less expertise in these 
areas – requires significant numbers of well-trained staff, whom it may take some time for 
the AIIB to hire. 
 
Finally, there is a technical issue that would restrict the level of activity. As described above, 
the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement specify that total loans and other operations by the AIIB 
cannot exceed total capital, and the latter presently equals US$100bn. This 1:1 ratio 
established in the Articles of Agreement between total capital and loans, also called the 
gearing ratio (see above), implies a maximum stock of loans of US$100bn. To allow levels of 
lending to the above US$100bn would require some increase of capital (this is very possible 
if new members were to join, which is allowed in the Articles of Agreement, and a number of 
countries are interested) or an increase of the ratio between total loans to total capital is 
approved. This is also feasible, as a 2.5:1 ratio is permitted, but requires the approval of a 
Super Majority on the AIIB Board.  
 
It is interesting in this context that the EIB, differently from the other MDBs, has a gearing 
ratio of up to 2.5:1, without affecting its AAA credit rating. This would seem to indicate that 
having a higher gearing ratio (higher total loans to total capital) does not affect much an 
MDB rating. Indeed, several expert observers (interview material) have commented that a 
strict gearing ratio by itself may be somewhat old-fashioned and that rating agencies may 
give more attention to ratios linking paid-in capital to risk-weighted measures of loans and 
other transactions, as used by private bank regulators. This would make an increase of the 
AIIB gearing ratio after it has been operating successfully a couple of years quite feasible, 
without a negative effect on its rating. Naturally, discussion of this with rating agencies would 
be desirable. 
 
The initial experience of the EIB and the World Bank, in terms of the fairly low level of their 
initial lending and the slow start they made in increasing such lending, is interesting in this 
regard. In the whole of the first decade of its existence (1959–68), for example, the EIB only 
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lent €9.9bn, expressed in 2014 Euros (based on calculations in Griffith-Jones et al. 2005, 
which have been updated). The lending growth of the EIB accelerated in the second decade 
of its existence, when EIB total lending reached €43.4bn, also expressed in 2014 Euros. EIB 
lending has continued to increase significantly, and just in one year – 2014 – the level of its 
total loans, mainly in the EU, but also in other countries, reached €77bn, ten times what it 
lent in the whole of its first decade, 1959–68. 
 
Annual World Bank lending was also relatively low and stable in the 1960s. During the 
1970s, this rose rapidly, averaging US$22.2bn per year (in 2013 dollar terms), and rose 
again to US$34.2bn per year in the 1980s. The 1990s saw lending remain broadly stable in 
real terms, before falling sharply in the first half of the 2000s. The sharp increase in World 
Bank lending triggered by the financial crisis saw Bank lending rise sharply, exceeding 
US$60bn in one year at the end of the decade. Although lending then returned to more 
‘normal’ levels, it has subsequently risen sharply, exceeding US$61bn again in 2014 in 
nominal terms.  
 
In terms of the growth of lending, the AIIB has the important advantage of being a late-
comer, and can benefit from the experience of existing MDBs, the RDBs, as well as the 
valuable national development bank experience of its member countries, starting with the 
CDB, the largest national development bank in the world, which has played a major role in 
the funding of Chinese infrastructure, including in recent years, renewable energy. Also 
valuable will be the experience of KfW, the second largest commercial bank in Germany, 
which has also played a major role in the development of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, both in Germany and internationally (for the latter, see Griffith-Jones, 
forthcoming).  
 
The AIIB also has the advantage of today’s much larger international capital market, as well 
as the deep and large Chinese capital market. This is somewhat different to the EIB in its 
original decade when it faced the still underdeveloped and fragmented European capital 
markets. Furthermore, most borrowers in the early 1960s preferred not to take currency 
risks, and therefore borrowed in European currencies; the EIB itself could not then easily 
swap borrowing in the deeper US market into European currencies, as such instruments 
were not yet very developed. This is quite different today. 
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6 The AIIB as a new ‘knowledge bank’? 
 
Development ‘knowledge’ refers to the theories and methodological framework that have 
guided interventions and development practices during the post-Second World War era. 
Neoclassical economics, and to lesser extent, anthropologists, have been central to this 
process. The work of these scholars has created what we call development knowledge 
today, which has been transformed from an understanding of ‘uncivilised people’ during the 
colonial era to a systematic understanding of the ‘developing world’, or ‘third world’ as it was 
formerly known. Despite its academic rationale, contemporary development knowledge is 
thus the product of constructed academic theories drawn from particular historical 
experiences. Development economics is no different, and has had a predominant influence 
on global development thinking, particularly on the World Bank’s development knowledge 
production.  
 
Much of the lessons from existing development financing institutions, specifically from the 
World Bank and EIB, that could be useful for the AIIB are discussed above. While important, 
these insights are only part of the story. To understand what the AIIB, and similar institutions 
could contribute over the longer term, and why this is so important, we need to take a step 
back and consider how current development knowledge – particularly that from the World 
Bank – has been constructed, produced and used.  
6.1 Historical foundations of contemporary development 
knowledge  
Historically speaking, contemporary development knowledge was based on the construction 
of relationships between European and non-Europeans through pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial times. After decolonisation, the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ replaced earlier, 
more pejorative, concepts and the responsibility of the ‘developed’ thus became to help 
others to achieve this status. The relationship between the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, has 
therefore always been unequal, not only politically and economically, but also 
epistemologically, with knowledge about what ‘development’ means being dominated by 
countries which were part of the ‘developed world’.  
 
It thus became accepted that developing countries could and should learn from the 
experiences of the already developed countries because the latter were richer, and because 
their societies were distinguished by economic, social, cultural and political modernity, which 
contrasted sharply with the traditional value of underdeveloped countries. Therefore, 
economic development came to be seen as not merely a change of production techniques, 
but also a reorientation of social norms and values (Hoselitz 1952). Under this transformative 
development model, developing countries needed to mobilise domestic and foreign saving to 
create an investment pool from which they could finance their development programme. 
Given capital scarcity, development assistance would have to be made available. The 
Bretton Wood Institutions, like the World Bank and the RDBs, began to fill this gap.  
6.2 Experiences and lessons of development knowledge 
production of the World Bank 
The development knowledge which has guided the World Bank’s operation has developed 
historically and contextually. As described in earlier sections of this report, the World Bank’s 
initial role in financing infrastructure to promote economic development has gradually 
extended to more politicised, knowledge-related roles with regard to governance and 
institutions. The politicisation of development knowledge has been driven by the doctrine of 
‘modernisation’, which links economic development and political and social cultural change. 
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This discounts the importance of alternative development experiences, insisting that 
development can only occur in the context of overall institutional change. This framework 
has become widely accepted by development experts, and has had a profound influence on 
development policy and practice exercised by international development institutions like the 
World Bank.  
 
The Bank’s role has thus gradually extended from infrastructure financing to that of a 
‘knowledge bank’ that produces theory, concepts and their practical applications for global 
development. We do not deny many of the positive impacts on equitable human wellbeing 
the Bank has had, rather the aim is to draw attention to how historical and contemporary 
political and economic forces have shaped the World Bank’s development operation. In this 
regard, it is important to note that the Bank’s decisions have been shaped by the political 
and economic agenda of its major shareholders. 
 
The World Bank has aspired to a leadership role in the intellectual realm of development at 
least since the Robert McNamara era, which was discussed above. The knowledge mission 
continued during James Wolfensohn’s Presidency of the Bank in the 1990s (Van 
Waeyenberge and Fine 2011), expanding into broader issues of development, with the Bank 
actively promoting itself as a source of ‘global knowledge’. The Bank’s knowledge is 
produced in different ways: academic research by the World Bank research department; 
applied analytical studies in operational departments; the training programmes of the Work 
Bank Institute; and several important and powerful global knowledge and policy networks. 
The Bank’s development knowledge system produces thousands of publications and papers, 
and hundreds of books and reports annually, and spends significant funds. These activities 
make the Bank one of the most powerful knowledge producers in the world, and the key 
knowledge broker in global development sector.  
 
The World Bank’s knowledge production has changed the approach to global development 
in important ways. First, it has provided the systematic knowledge to develop managerial 
techniques such as planning and monitoring and evaluation. Second, it has provided the 
knowledge base for tackling many new challenges such as environment and natural 
resources management, climate change and social safeguards. Incorporating social justice 
and environmental standards in its operations and transferring them to recipients is among 
the most important, positive contribution the Bank’s knowledge system has made. Third, the 
World Bank’s knowledge network approach has efficiently disseminated and shared 
knowledge, influencing the activities of other actors.  
 
It is important that the AIIB can take many of these positive experiences from the World 
Bank into its own knowledge production initiative. However, beyond these positive lessons, 
there are also negative lessons the AIIB needs to take from the World Bank in terms of 
development knowledge production. First is a political and ideological bias. As mentioned 
above, the Bank’s knowledge is produced historically and contextually. It cannot be politically 
neutral, as is often argued, particularly given the influence of its major shareholders, and that 
of the financial markets on the Bank. The second lesson is to avoid professional bias. The 
Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC), for example, is dominated by economists 
who are graduates of economics departments of English-speaking, largely US universities, 
and neoclassical economics is the Bank’s ‘high scholarly discipline’ (Gwin 1994; Wade 1996; 
Kapur, Lewis and Webb 1997). The third lesson is to avoid methodological bias, including: 
poor engagement with non-mainstream views, poor coherence and integration, and limited 
self-criticism.  
 
The centralisation of knowledge, particularly the ability to determine what is, and what is not 
knowledge, is obscured by the mystique of scientific objectivity, which has also encouraged 
the bias in favour of particular forms of economics. While neoliberalism has been privileged, 
there have always been dissenting voices in the World Bank. More recently, it is 
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encouraging that Chief Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Justin Lin have begun to 
open up the Bank to alternative points of view.  
6.3 The AIIB as an alternative ‘knowledge bank’? 
In time, the AIIB will have to consider the role of development knowledge in promoting 
infrastructure for development. If it is to achieve its own objectives, as well as provide 
valuable lessons for other countries on the development process, it cannot simply adopt the 
existing knowledge framework. To date, the AIIB has taken seriously many of the practical 
lessons from existing development institutions but has not paid sufficient attention to the role 
of knowledge in its operation. The challenge ahead for the AIIB will be how to assimilate the 
experiences and lessons from the existing institutions and develop alternative forms of 
development knowledge to guide its operation in a meaningful way. Practically, the AIIB 
cannot avoid the debate around the role of market and state, for example, which is 
particularly important in the infrastructure sector. The challenge the AIIB faces in this regard 
is how successful development experiences as well as lessons from China and other 
emerging countries can be theorised into a systematic knowledge base.  
 
Whilst the ambition for the AIIB should be to establish itself as an alternative knowledge 
bank on these core development questions, we would suggest it start with a narrower focus 
on all relevant aspects of infrastructure. This could include technical and practical aspects, 
such as project design and implementation, including from an engineering perspective, in 
different categories of countries. Linking these factors to development impacts could inform 
technical assistance in poorer countries, helping the development and implementation of 
efficient projects that maximise development impacts. In this regard, the AIIB could 
showcase its most successful projects for others, both MDBs, national development banks 
and private investors, to emulate. Knowledge creation should also cover the most 
appropriate financial instruments for funding infrastructure in different circumstances, but 
also cover broader issues such as the best policy framework for encouraging investment in 
renewable energy, for example. As suggested above, a crucial point is to identify the best 
way of handling possible trade-offs between environmental standards and meeting the 
development needs of different categories of borrowers. 
 
Learning from the World Bank experience, the AIIB could not just focus on creation of 
knowledge, but also its dissemination, for example through a special training institute (like 
the World Bank or ADB Institutes). It could also use its growing knowledge base to become 
active in technical assistance. 
 
While the focus would be on alternative and new thinking, this knowledge construction 
should also build on the many positive elements in existing knowledge in institutions like the 
World Bank and other MDBs and national development banks, UN bodies and the private 
sector, as well as by a range of academics and practitioners, both in developing and 
developed countries. In time, collaborative research may be the best way of achieving this.  
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7 Suggestions for future research and 
concluding remarks 
 
In this report we have explored what ‘lessons’ the AIIB can learn from the experience of the 
World Bank and the EIB. The first lesson to highlight is to focus on developmentally 
important sectors. By establishing itself as an infrastructure bank, the AIIB will clearly do this. 
Another important issue in this regard is to focus on maximising ‘development returns’ rather 
than financial returns, while also ensuring the latter remain positive. As well as selecting 
projects that will yield positive returns, key to this is to avoid unexpected losses, which 
requires a robust approach to risk assessment and management.  
 
The second lesson is to provide the right form of finance: in this case, long-term, affordable 
finance, primarily – though not exclusively – in debt form. We have also suggested that, 
particularly in its early years, the AIIB should also rely on straightforward, ‘vanilla’ 
instruments, and avoid the temptation to engage in excessive financial engineering.  
 
A third lesson is the importance of integrating environmental and social safeguards into 
lending activities. Where the AIIB has the potential to contribute significantly, however, is in 
developing ways to do this in less time-consuming and resource-intensive ways than can be 
the case at present. In this regard, the EIB may have important lessons to teach, but all 
MDBs could benefit from finding a way to achieve the right balance in this area, so that the 
investment process can be significantly speeded up without sacrificing environmental and 
social standards. The ongoing World Bank review of policy in this area offers a significant 
window of opportunity in this regard.  
 
We have also seen that the AIIB has much to contribute, not least as an alternative 
‘knowledge bank’ that can draw on a different set of historical experiences and perspectives 
to the World Bank, which currently dominates this space globally. How this unfolds over time 
will be crucial to the evolving global development finance landscape.  
 
There is much that we do not yet know, however. Some of the most important potential 
directions for future research are: 
 
i. Examine what lessons can be learnt from the experience of national development 
banks (e.g. CDB, Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES, Brazilian 
Development Bank), KfW), particularly the role of the CDB in promoting domestic 
development in China; 
ii. Undertake in-depth research on future options for AIIB as a knowledge bank, 
particularly how it can complement existing institutions, and make the most of the 
accumulated knowledge of its members;  
iii. More generally, examine how the AIIB can best work with other actors to maximise 
development impact, for example in collaboration with other MDBs and the private 
sector;  
iv. Evaluate which mix of financial instruments is best suited to maximising development 
impacts in different contexts (i.e. different sectors and countries); and 
v. Increase understanding of the best strategies, modalities and instruments for AIIB 
activities in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors.  
 
No doubt there will be many other areas that the AIIB will wish to prioritise in terms of 
research. One thing seems certain, however: we are entering a period of significant change 
in international development finance. It is to be hoped that this will become a golden era of 
development banks, when their potential to contribute to global and national development 
goals will finally be realised in full.  
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